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HR 5775 119th Congress · House

Bill Would Cap FCRA Class-Action Exposure and Standardize Damages

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Official title: FCRA Liability Harmonization Act

The FCRA Liability Harmonization Act would change how civil lawsuits work under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, especially class actions. It would cap class recovery for willful violations at the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of a defendant’s net worth, and for negligent violations at the same $500,000 or 1% cap, while also limiting attorney’s fees and costs. The bill also sets new limits on individual statutory-damages awards in willful noncompliance cases and ties some recovery limits to 40% of damages awarded by a court. These changes would mainly affect credit reporting companies, furnishers of credit information, and consumers who sue under the FCRA.

  • Caps willful FCRA class-action recovery at the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the defendant’s net worth.
  • Caps negligent FCRA class-action recovery at the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the defendant’s net worth.
  • Bars courts from applying a minimum damages amount for each class member in willful class actions.
  • Limits certain individual statutory-damages awards to the lesser of $100,000 or 40% of damages awarded.
  • Limits costs and attorney’s fees to the lower of $100,000 or 40% of actual damages in the specified provisions.
Public Relevance 28 / 100
Niche Modest scope Broad

If you are a consumer involved in a credit-reporting lawsuit, this bill would mainly change how much money can be recovered in a class action under the FCRA. It would cap total class recovery at the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the defendant’s net worth for both willful and negligent claims, and it would limit attorney’s fees and costs in those cases. That could mean smaller settlements or judgments for groups of affected consumers, even though individual claims for actual harm would still remain available.

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FOR
  • Credit reporting companies They are likely to argue that the bill creates clearer, more predictable exposure in class actions and reduces the risk of outsized verdicts unrelated to the actual harm proven. A fixed cap tied to net worth or $500,000 makes it easier to assess litigation risk and may encourage faster resolution of disputes.
  • Banks, lenders, and other furnishers of credit information These businesses may support the measure because FCRA class actions can be expensive even when the underlying data error is technical or procedural. Lower caps could reduce settlement pressure and make liability more proportional to the size of the defendant and the actual damages shown.
  • Small and mid-sized companies subject to FCRA claims Smaller firms may see the 1% net-worth cap and the fee limits as protection against bankruptcy-level exposure from class litigation. They may argue that the bill preserves consumer remedies while preventing punishment that is out of scale with the violation.
AGAINST
  • Consumer advocates They are likely to argue that the bill weakens the deterrent effect of class actions and makes it harder for consumers to challenge widespread credit-reporting failures. If total recovery is capped at $500,000 or 1% of net worth, a large class may receive little compensation per person.
  • Consumers with widespread credit-reporting errors People harmed by a systemic mistake may oppose the bill because it could reduce the value of class-wide relief even when many consumers were affected by the same noncompliance. That may leave individual lawsuits as the main option, which is often impractical for small-dollar injuries.
  • Plaintiffs' lawyers handling FCRA cases They may argue that tighter limits on damages, costs, and attorney’s fees will make it harder to bring complex class actions that uncover broad compliance problems. Lower fee recovery could reduce the incentives to take on cases involving many consumers with modest individual losses.
  • “the total recovery ... of the class may not exceed the lesser of— $500,000; or 1 percent of the net worth”

    This is the bill’s main brake on class-action exposure. Even if many consumers are harmed, the collective payout cannot go above the smaller of those two figures.

  • “the court may not apply a minimum amount of damages for each member of the class”

    This prevents courts from awarding a set floor amount to every class member. For consumers, that can reduce the per-person recovery in cases where the damages are hard to measure individually.

  • “not to exceed the lesser of— $100,000; or ... 40 percent of any damages awarded”

    This fee-and-cost cap appears in the bill’s individual and class-action provisions. It could limit what lawyers recover in successful FCRA cases, which may affect which cases get filed and how they are litigated.

  • “a person who negligently fails to comply ... is liable ... in an amount equal to the sum of any actual damages”

    Negligent violations still allow consumers to recover actual losses, but the bill adds a new class-action ceiling. That means the underlying right to sue remains, while the overall class recovery is constrained.

BillBoard checks this page against public Congress.gov metadata, then adds plain-English analysis where available.

Bill
HR 5775
Congress
119th Congress
Official title
FCRA Liability Harmonization Act
Policy area
Economy & Finance
Latest action
Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 27 - 23. (June 30, 2026)
Last updated
July 1, 2026

June 30, 2026

Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by the Yeas and Nays: 27 - 23.

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